The intent of this project is to complete a comparative analysis of current US Navy Mine
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MINE COUNTERMEASURES CAPABILITIES FOR THE YEAR 2020
A war in which enemies seldom meet and battle is rarely joined, but death and destruction always mark the field. Where the big ships fight their battles, and the little mine craft have already been to do their dull and dirty duty, in which there is no glory.
Where the fighting fleets sail to victory, there are the seas of glory. But where the little ships go, there is the most dangerous sea. This is mine warfare.
-Arnolds. Lott LCDR, USN
The preeminent naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, based his greatest work on the premise that sea power was vital to national growth, prosperity, and security. 2 While there are many aspects of sea power, sea control is a cornerstone. In turn, mine warfare can play a key role in sea control. It is somewhat surprising then, that the United States Navy, unquestionably the greatest naval power in the world today, has paid such little homage to this aspect of naval warfare.
Some have argued that this is because mine warfare is seen as underhanded, not a gentlemanly way of conducting warfare. 3 Others point out the difficulty in assessing its effectiveness. 4 After all, if mines effectively close a harbor and no ships transit in or out, how does one measure the value of ships not sunk, personnel not transported or cargo not delivered? What if other ports or modes of transportation can make up the lion's share of the difference numerically, though maybe at a greater cost of time and/or money? The opinion of many inside of the mine warfare community might very well be that this branch of warfare is considered "second rate" because it is quiet, unglamorous and difficult to understand. This paper will focus almost exclusively on the mine countermeasures portion of mine warfare, as opposed to mining or mine laying (which can be offensive or defensive in nature). Specifically, it will cover some highlights of the history of mine warfare in the United States Navy, review current mine countermeasures capabilities, including concept of operations and then, based on current programming efforts, compare current capabilities to expected capabilities in 2020. This comparison will be from a theater capability perspective, with generic time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) implications.
HISTORY
EARLY HISTORY
The history of mine warfare and the United States Armed forces dates back to 1777 and the American revolutionary War. In December of that year, George Washington authorized David Bushnell to proceed with a plan of floating explosive charges down the Delaware River towards British warships anchored at Philadelphia. 5 These newly invented sea mines, termed "torpedoes" by their inventor, were simply watertight kegs, charged with gunpowder, actuated by a flintlock firing mechanism and suspended below the surface of the water by a float. 6 For a variety of reasons, none of these devices ever contacted the hulls of the ships for which they were intended.
This initial mining operation proved to be the only use of this device during the Revolutionary War and an inauspicious start for the United States in mine warfare. The entire operation may even have gone unnoticed by the British, had it not been for the death of two boys, who found one of the kegs and detonated it in the process of trying to retrieve it. 7 The first documented use of a mine countermeasure device occurred in 1862, during the American Civil War. Union naval forces constructed a raft with grappling hooks attached in order to "catch" the mooring lines of mines [torpedoes] . 8 A similar "mine catcher" was rigged to the sloop Brooklyn, which preceded Admiral Farragut into Mobile Bay in 1864. 9 This foray into the area of mine countermeasures, although successful in terms of the capture of the forts protecting Mobile Bay and ultimately the city of Mobile in 1865, was not without the loss of the monitor Tecumseh. 10 
WORLD WAR I
For the remainder of the 19 th century, the United States did very little in developing this emerging aspect of warfare and upon entering World War I in 1917, was in virtually the same position with respect to capabilities as at the end of the Civil War. 11 Nearly all mines used during the war were moored, contact mines (requiring a vessel to impact against them to actuate). Countermeasures, or minesweeping, were conducted by dragging a cable horizontally through the water, either behind two ships or paravaned behind one, creating a swept path. 12 The United States Navy became adept at these procedures, clearing up the North Sea Barrage following the war, and thus became proficient with respect to the state of the art technology, procedures and tactics ofthat era.
INTER-WAR PERIOD
Post-World War I, the United States prepared to continue development of mines, mine laying and mine sweeping technologies. A "Mine Building" was established at the Washington Navy Yard in 1919 to house physicists, engineers and draftsmen. This workshop was eventually incorporated within the Bureau of Ordnance, during its reorganization in 1929, and became part of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. 1 However, in spite of the appearance of dedication to mine warfare, progress and development projects was very slow and sporadic. Funding initially designated for mine work, was added to the general fund and was rapidly lost thereafter for its original appropriation. 14 A magnetic sweep was developed, consisting of two electrodes towed behind a mine sweeping vessel, with a generator onboard which passed an electric current from one electrode to the other. This current produced a magnetic field behind the minesweeper that simulated the magnetic field of a ship passing over the mines. 1 As acoustic mines were developed, towed devices that produced noise, in the appropriate frequency ranges to simulate ships, followed rapidly. By the end of the war, reliable pressure sensors were developed for mine actuators. This enabled mines to require a combination of magnetic, acoustic and pressure signature of a vessel in order to satisfy the mine firing logic. Mine countermeasures were successfully developed which enabled satisfactory sweeping of magnetic and acoustic combinations, but to this day scientists have not been able to develop a pressure sweep. The only countermeasures for mines with a pressure sensors was to use a specially ballasted ship as a "guinea pig" sweep, or a ship self-defense tactic of transiting areas with pressure mines at speeds of 4 knots or less. 17 
KOREA
Following World War II, researchers judged that the ushering in of the atomic age and the associated requirement for extensive air defense would make laying offensive minefields nearly impossible and the use of defensive minefields obsolete. The days of mine warfare were, in effect,
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over. This was the general mind set when the United States found its armed forces engaged in Korea.
Here World War I era mines, along with more modern weapons, delayed operations at Wonsan for weeks while too few minesweepers cleared minefields that had not been anticipated. "Admiral Jay said later that the main lesson of the Wonsan operation was that "no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future."" 19 The final result for the United States Navy was that mine countermeasures were specifically given a higher priority than mine development, but that is not to say that mine warfare was given adequate consideration in the overall picture of appropriations.
MODERN ERA
Through the 1950's and 60's, the Mine Defense Laboratory at Panama City, FL continued promising research in minesweeping, minehunting, mine classification and mine neutralization, including the development of helicopter mine countermeasures. These technological advancements were put into use during Operation End Sweep, following the war in Vietnam. However, these clearance operations were made easier by the fact that we were clearing our own minefields. Our adversaries note this cycle as well and their corollary is see the success of mines during conflict, continue development of mine technology during peacetime and to capitalize on the high return for low investment associated with this weapon. 23 The United States Navy can ill afford to allow this cycle to continue.
CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE & CAPABILITIES.
The United States Navy's dedicated mine countermeasures force is a triad of capabilities, consisting of aviation, surface and diving (EOD, marine mammals and Navy Special Warfare (NSW) forces) components. Each of these brings a unique capability to the mine clearance effort. Both the Avenger and Osprev class vessels are capable of deploying overseas. However, due to their size, they are limited in endurance. A "mother" ship will accompany their transit, refueling them about every third day and provisioning food weekly. Osprev class ships have a maximum speed often knots, Avenger class fourteen, and both transit a approximately eight knots with a "mother" ship. They can also be loaded aboard specialized heavy-lift ships for transit into theater. EOD detachments are comprised of divers or teams of divers and marine mammal systems.
Divers conduct search operations and/or prosecute contacts obtained by airborne or surface platforms.
Contacts positively identified as mines can be either neutralized or recovered for exploitation.
Exploitation is invaluable for determining mine sensitivity and sensor operating characteristics for influence sweeping operations.
Marine mammal systems incorporate specially trained Atlantic and Pacific bottlenose dolphins and sea lions for mine detection and neutralization. l Specially designed tanks allow deployment of mammal systems to be accomplished via ships or strategic airlift. Transportation between coastal operating areas and airfields, when deployed by air, can be by truck or heavy lift helicopters.
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CURRENT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
There are a wide variety of scenarios in which mined ports or sea lines of communication would This scenario, the air deployment of command and staff element, aviation and EOD units, presents the most favorable timeline for United States forces. However, it requires a significant infrastructure to support units ashore. An alternative to keeping these units ashore would be to embark them on naval assets in theater, though this would typically mean taking a ship from the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). This is often an unacceptable solution and is the specific reason for the conversion of the USS Inchon. Homeported in the Gulf of Mexico, USS Inchon could be in any theater within thirty days, provided it was not escorting surface mine countermeasures vessels. Escorting these vessels effectively doubles USS Inchon's transit time. Following arrival of all units, clearance of the AOA was successfully completed within nine days and fully met the commander's objectives for commencement of follow-on operations. 33 Assuming force deployment follows a scenario similar to that discussed above, a single mined port could be opened up in theater within eighteen days (inclusive of transit time) of the deployment order.
Operations requiring multiple ports would require deployment of more than one aircraft detachment and additional EOD detachments. It is not likely that two ports, separated by any significant distance, could be opened up in the same time frame, as there would not be sufficient surface assets to work both ports.
(The only theater, in which multiple ports could possibly be opened, within a fourteen to eighteen day period, would be the Arabian Gulf. Here, no delays in the commencement of fully integrated mine countermeasures operations exist at all, as presently, EOD, aviation and surface assets are all forward deployed in theater. ) Again, tempo of operations could be accelerated by the presence of a mine countermeasures support platform, but there would usually be a delay getting it into theater.
Several other factors could significantly affect port clearance for delivery of follow-on forces. These include, but are not limited to, attrition of mine countermeasures forces, weather conditions (e.g.
excessive sea states hampering surface and diver operations), sea bottom topography conditions which preclude minehunting (e.g. high density of bottom clutter generating too many mine-like contacts, or soft mud allowing mines to bury) and enemy reseeding of cleared areas.
In summary, there are many factors that affect the timeliness of mine clearance operations.
Provided a developing crisis is correctly assessed, mine countermeasures units are deployed promptly, and airlift is available to move the forces, current mine countermeasures capabilities allow for sequential clearance of ports required for arrival of sealift elements. However, given the slow transit speed of surface minesweepers and the limited number of assets, any significant breakdown in threat assessment, delay in deployment orders, or shortfall of lift could easily lead to another "Wonsan Harbor" and delays of weeks to clear minefields that were not properly anticipated.
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FUTURE CAPABILITIES
My goal is to go organic. 
EOD
EOD force structure and capability is likely to be affected the least by the upcoming changes.
Current EOD force structure supports many operations besides mine countermeasures and it is therefore unlikely that even drastic changes in the conduct of mine countermeasures will generate a significant change in these forces. Current force enhancements for EOD include better mobile support facilities that will provide field diver recompression treatment and improved maintenance for diving equipment. These will directly impact safety and sustainability. Additionally, improvements are expected for divers' equipment, hand-held sonar, underwater explosives and firing mechanisms as well as systems for recovering and exploiting mines. 37 However, while these will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of EOD operations, they will not yield any magnitude of reduction in the overall time required for the conduct of mine countermeasures operations. 
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These changes have significant implications. The CH-60S will be the only helicopter capable of conducting mine countermeasures missions. There is no definite plan to maintain dedicated mine countermeasures detachments if/when the HM and HC communities merge. The HS community, although it will be equipped with the CH-60S, will find it difficult, if not impossible, to be trained in all warfare areas. The ML(DC) is the only existing airborne mine countermeasures system not used exclusively by the MH-53E. In other words, while the loss of the MH-53E has already been programmed, the systems required for the CH-60S to replace it are all in various stages of research and development.
Furthermore, there has not been a single new system, for airborne mine countermeasures, deployed to the fleet in over 15 years. To field an entirely new suite of systems by 2006 seems overly ambitious.
However, the systems currently under development for the CH-60S, do cover the entire spectrum of mine countermeasures requirements. The footprint associated with these proposed systems is also smaller than that of the MH-53E systems. They are smaller in size, lighter in weight and each can be carried internal to the CH-60S helicopter. (Currently, the MH-53E utilizes a large hydrofoil sled for magnetic influence sweeping which is streamed from a beach site or lowered into the water from a ship's crane.)
These attributes are critical for fleet integration.
The first of these new systems is the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), based on a laser radar, or LIDAR (Light Detection and ranging). While this technology has been used for a number of years in other applications, it has only recently reached a stage of precision for detecting objects such as mines. 43 The ML(DC), currently operated by HSL-94 on its SH-2G's, is a LIDAR based system that has helped refine the technology for this application. The ALMDS for the CH-60S will be pod mounted, making it easier to install on any CH-60S helicopter. 44 
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The prototype is currently under test and evaluation. Production of this new sonar will not occur for the MH-53E, but rather it will serve as the basis for design, development and integration of the AN/AQS-20X for the CH-60S. 47 The AN/AQS-20X will likely be a laser based identification sensor, with the for RAMICS and will also be able to sweep in conditions where the water properties are not conducive to LI DAR targeting of mines. Its speed is significantly greater than current airborne and surface influence sweeps and will yield correspondingly greater coverage rates depending on its effective sweep width. The Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) is the last of the new systems under development. This remotely operated system will be able to explosively neutralize unburied bottom and moored mines in deep or shallow water. The AMNS components will include an operator's console within the helicopter and maneuverable expendable mine neutralizers. The operator will be able to guide the neutralizer to a previously detected and classified target and, upon command, detonate its charge from 49 an optimal position to neutralize the mine. Fly-by-wire as well as radio control of the mine neutralizer are under evaluation. The day/night capability of this system will be another significant enhancement to current capabilities. The deep-water capabilities of the AMNS will bridge the gap between the deep minehunting capability of the AN/AQS-20X and the shallower capabilities of the RAMICS and OASIS.
PHASE
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The explosive neutralization capability also provides a countermeasure to pressure mines not currently available aside from EOD. Future capabilities will exceed current capabilities only to the extent that development achieves currently anticipated parameters.
With the advent of these new, improved systems, it would appear that the United States Navy is on the verge of entering a grand new era of mine countermeasures. The resolve to complete the programs that have been undertaken is paramount. Robust, state-of-the-art systems will be employed from new platforms and be immediately available to the Battle group Commander. The last link to success will be in the execution. A review of possible concepts of operations for these new forces will show that there are still a number of issues that may be problematic. There will also be C2 challenges specific to the Mine Warfare Commander. The capability to conduct a mine countermeasure operation has never been requisite knowledge for fleet commanders.
CHALLENGES & FUTURE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
CHALLENGES
The suite of C4I systems currently used by the Mine Countermeasures Group Commander is not installed on any ship besides the USS Inchon and would be difficult to deploy aboard a ship that was already out to sea. While the elements may be present to conduct the operations themselves, organic C2 of those elements has not been programmed to date.
The organic mine countermeasures forces of 2020 may also be challenged by the lack of EOD personnel. Much like organic C2 capabilities, there is no program addressing the issue of how to provide the EOD capability as an inherent part of the Battle group. Should the need arise to conduct influence sweeping operations, exploitation of the mine threat is the only means to obtain invaluable information.
NSW detachments, currently deployed aboard aircraft carriers, may be able to bridge this gap. However, these forces are, by nature, high-demand/low-density units and will be assigned more critical roles in nearly all cases.
The next greatest challenge to the Navy in implementing organic mine countermeasures will be its effect on the composition of the dedicated mine countermeasures forces. As previously stated, the HM and HC communities will likely merge. This will generate an organic capability to a battle group consisting of two destroyers equipped with the RMS, divers from the NSW detachment aboard the aircraft carrier, and possibly as many as eleven CH-60S helicopters, if the carrier battle group is accompanied by an ARG. The helicopters would be available from the HS squadron on the carrier (six), fleet oiler (two),
another auxiliary ship (one) and the ARG's LHA or LHD (two). However, as discussed next under "Future Concepts of Operations," extended dedication of these assets to mine countermeasures may not be feasible and a detachment of dedicated mine countermeasures helicopters could be required. There is no definitive plan that such a detachment will be available. Similarly, with all mine countermeasures programming directed towards development of organic capabilities, there is no plan for replacement of current surface mine sweepers and hunters.
Lastly, the Navy of the future is going to be challenged by the lack of full integration of the new organic capabilities. As previously mentioned, seventy-five percent of the Navy's combatant ships will be equipped with the new Remote Minehunting System. Conversely, a full quarter of the combatants will not have any inherent capability. The Surface Action Groups (SAG's) will deploy with a minehunting capability only, as the embarked SH-60R's will not be equipped, nor trained, to conduct organic mine countermeasures. Cruisers, often the main unit in a SAG, will possess no organic capability at all.
Accompanying destroyers may have the RMS, but will not be equipped to neutralize any mines found with their minehunting system. Ships conducting independent steaming operations will face the same conditions, destroyers will be capable of minehunting only and cruisers will have no additional capability.
Dedicated mine countermeasures ships may be capable of hunting their way through a minefield, but for a destroyer, this becomes a deadly game of "blind man's bluff."
FUTURE CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS
The Navy and Marine Corps concepts for the future are expressed in "Forward... From the Sea"
(FFTS) and "Operational Maneuver from the sea" (OMFTS). Clearly, naval forces will be required to operate in the littoral regions of the world, where the mine threat is greatest. 51 While using the sea as maneuver space and projecting power ashore from the littorals require an organic capability to combat mines, the concepts of increased stand-off range, Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) and reduced footprints ashore, lend themselves to delineating minefields, avoiding them or breaching them, vice clearing them. Current Battle Group forces might only become aware of a mined port by losing a ship. Or, if it was feared that mining had occurred, forces might be inordinately delayed just trying to confirm whether or not mines had been laid. Currently programmed organic capabilities significantly reduce these hazards.
Scenario #2: Organic Mine Countermeasures as a Force Substitute
While there is no official discussion of doing away with dedicated forces at this time, its discussion is almost unavoidable. If the historic "Mine Warfare Cycles" (Figure 1 ) continue, the future capabilities may be organic only. This will lead to a different scenario. As budget constraints continue, and the "peace dividend" fails to materialize, the Navy could be forced to find further efficiencies. It is expected that fleet assets should be able to perform every type of operation that dedicated mine countermeasures forces can. Not being able to justify this "redundancy," the Navy might select to decommission all dedicated mine countermeasures units. The following scenario might develop:
As a crisis "heats up," a Battle Group arrives on scene. Hostilities increase and the nation we are supporting finds its ports blocked by an enemy mining campaign. United States assistance is requested.
With no dedicated assets to deploy, a decision has to be made to either deny assistance to a friendly nation or obligate a Battle Group to extensive, time consuming, mine clearance operations, risking valuable assets.
The speed of any clearance operation is directly related to the number of assets dedicated to the mission. Even with full-time dedication of all organic capabilities, it is unlikely that a Battle Group would have sufficient organic mine countermeasures capability to open a port in less than three weeks. (With multiple ports mined, operations could easily continue for months.) As previously delineated, the Battle Group might be able to employ up to eleven CH-60S helicopters for mine countermeasures operations.
However, no Battle Group Commander could fathom losing his logistic helicopter support for three weeks.
Reducing the number of helicopters designated for mine countermeasures would further delay the operations. Furthermore, if the hostile nation had a diesel submarine threat, the mine countermeasures assets required to remain close to shore could not remain in such a vulnerable position. Due to this submarine threat, the Mine Warfare Commander might be directed to continue operations with only helicopters. Even without a submarine threat, there is always a risk, even to minesweepers designed for the task, that a destroyer could actuate a mine while minehunting and sink. The organic forces at this point would be overwhelmed. The end result would be considerable delays to the time-phased delivery of forces. If it is true that "the one, who gets there first, with the most, wins," in this scenario, it might not be us.
CONCLUSION
The United States finds itself in a world where it has no peer competitor. The fact that each of its branches of the armed forces has no equal makes it all the more likely that it will face asymmetrical threats. Mines present just such a threat. There are more than forty-eight navies with mine laying capabilities and at least thirty countries actively engaged in developing and manufacturing mines. Two thirds of these are exporting mines. It is unreasonable to expect that the mine warfare cycles previously discussed will be broken, unless it is done by the United States Navy committing itself to developing and maintaining mine countermeasures capabilities at a rate matching those of the rest of the Naval Warfare areas.
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In the opinion of the author, either of the two scenarios presented for 2020 is equally feasible.
While having organic assets is certainly a great advantage, not maintaining a robust dedicated capability can be catastrophic. "History indicates that a significantly greater commitment is needed to institutionalize mine countermeasures to the status of a warfare mission area." 56 The future concepts for naval operations laid out in FFTS and OMFTS do not specifically chart the course for mine countermeasures. Future documents need to address the envisioned concept of operations and specify the required mix of organic and dedicated mine countermeasures capabilities.
Actual mine countermeasures operations are rarely required. Unfortunately, this may add another challenge to the planned organic force structure. Platforms with many mission essential tasks will tend to emphasize training and readiness in those missions with a higher visibility. History has proven that mine countermeasures systems, and hence capabilities, will probably not remain adequately tested and maintained. Similarly, personnel will not maintain a sufficient level of training in equipment operation nor tactical proficiency. In short, a great capability may exist in theory, but readiness will suffer in materiel and personnel.
Hopefully the Navy will learn the right lessons from the past. Organic mine countermeasures need to be viewed as a force multiplier, not a substitute for dedicated assets. Given current fiscal constraints, funding of programs should be primarily oriented towards developing and fielding organic capabilities that the fleet lacks or that will enhance the Navy's ability to perform its joint war fighting requirements.
However, these developments should not be at the expense of maintaining current dedicated capabilities.
In many ways, the maintenance of a dedicated mine countermeasures force is similar to the strategic sea lift capability. It does not enhance the Navy's ability to maneuver. It does not project power ashore. Many years can go by before it is required. However, it does directly impact the ability to conduct joint operations. It directly affects the ability to get U.S. forces into theater, protecting what many see as a potential strategic center of gravity -Strategic Mobility. It took dramatic shortfalls, exhibited during the build up of forces for Operation Desert Storm, followed by direct intervention from the joint arena, for the Navy to appropriate the proper funding to strategic sea lift. Hopefully, the same will not be required to ensure a complete mine countermeasures capability is maintained.
The Navy needs to stay the course in aggressively pursuing organic mine countermeasures.
These should be fully fielded by 2010. Then, the Navy should once again be looking to refurbish its dedicated mine countermeasures community in order to retain its position as the preeminent naval power in the world. The cost to recapitalize the dedicated forces, to include the full mine countermeasures triad, needs to be measured, not against historical mine countermeasures expenditures, but against the risk presented to strategic mobility by not refurbishing the force.
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